GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
DEFENCE
LOK SABHA

STARRED QUESTION NO:202
ANSWERED ON:09.03.2000
REPORT ON PAK INTRUSION IN KARGIL
MADHAVRAO SCINDIA;SUSHIL KUMAR SAMBHAJIRAO SHINDE

Will the Minister of DEFENCE be pleased to state:

(a) the details of gaps and weakness in India`s defence and security system, pointed out by the Subrahmanyam Committee, which led to the large scale Pakistani intrusions in Kargil, last year;

(b) the follow-up action taken to fill up the gap;

(c) whether the Committee has fixed any responsibility for the intelligence failure; and

(d) if not, the reasons therefor?

Answer

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

(SHRI GEORGE FERNANDES)

(a) to (d): A statement is laid on the Table of the House.

STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN REPLY TO PARTS (a) TO (d) OF LOK SABHA STARRED QUESTION NO.202 FOR 9.3.2000
The report of the Kargil Review Committee (Subrahmanyam Committee) has been tabled in the Lok Sabha on 24th February, 2000 along with an Executive Summary thereof and a Report on action initiated by the Government.A request has also been made to the Hon`ble Speaker to consider the report in the House.

2. This Committee, which had been setup to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions has given its Findings on Developments leading to the Pakistani aggression, Intelligence, Counter Insurgency operations, Technological dimension and other related matters.

3. The report seeks to bring out certain deficiencies in the security management system in the context of the assessment made by the Committee of the Kargil experience. Most of the gaps/deficiencies in India`s defence and security system which have been pointed out by the Committee have been identified in the context of its recommendations for preventing future Kargil - like intrusions. The Committee has focussed primarily on systemic deficiencies and its recommendations are, broadly, generic in nature. The Committee has conceded that even if some critical missing inputs had been available, it might not necessarily have led to the forecasting of the type of intrusion that took place. In Kargil, Pakistan achieved surprise by moving into unheld gaps without generating any significant, observable activity during the preceding months of preparation on its own side of the LoC. The Committee has also pointed out that there was perhaps an unarticulated assumption in the military mind that a rational commander would not risk his troops at such avalanche-prone altitudes during winter.

4. While specifically addressing the question - `Could Kargil have been avoided?` - the Committeeobserved that a Kargil type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachinisation to plug the unheld gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobalgali to Chorbat La.This would have entailed establishing a series of winter cut-off posts with the communications and other logistic support and specially equipped and trained troops, to hold these positions and undertake winter patrolling despite risk of cold injuries and avalanche casualties which would have had to be accepted. Such a dispersal of forces would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort and would not have been at all cost effective. The Committee has categorised such a posture as `no more than a temporary expedient`.

5. The following major gaps and weaknesses in India`s defence security system have been identified by the Committee :-
a) Absence of adequate surveillance and intelligence capability including half-meter resolution satellite imagery capability, appropriate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and better human intelligence. The available satellite imageries are of a poorer resolution and UAVs cannot operate satisfactorily at the Kargil heights
b) Cross-border human intelligence efforts of all agencies come to a total standstill during winter months.
c) India`s human intelligence, communication intelligence and imagery intelligence in the FCNA region was inadequate. d) Winter Air Surveillance Operation flights in Kargil sector were inadequate and ineffective.More sophisticated sensors and better equipment are required. e) There is need for greater appreciation of the role of intelligence and who needs it most and also more understanding with regard to who must pursue any given lead. f) The various intelligence agencies/organisations i.e., Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) failed to share relevant information with eacl

other. Inter-agency interaction and coordination has been lacking. Arrangements for coordinated assessments were not satisfactory. g) The Indian intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in the intelligence collection and reporting that goes to build up the external threat perception by the one agency namely, R&AW, which has a virtual monopoly in this regard. h) The present structure and processes in intelligence gathering and reporting lead to an overload of background and unconfirmed information and inadequately assessed intelligence. There is no institutionalised process for periodic interaction at levels below the JIC.
i) The army never shared its intelligence with the other agencies or with the JIC.There was no system of army authorities at different levels from DGMI downwards providing feedback to the agencies. j) Army`s prolonged deployment in a counter-insurgency role has had an adverse effect on its training programme, fitness and exclusive attention to its primary role of defending the country against external aggression. k) The paramilitary and central police forces are not raised, trained and equipped to deal with trans-border terrorism by well trained mercenaries with latest equipment who continuously infiltrate across the border at LoC. 6. The recommendations made by the Committee have been considered. Those in the category of acquisition of equipment for surveillance and communication interception and encryption and decryption have been accepted, in principle, for implementation. Recommendations that mainly deal with improvement in the areas of intelligence, manpower management and structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Services Hqrs at the apex level, are by way of general suggestions, which need to be developed into specific actionable policies and programmes. Some recommendations like reduction in the colour service of the Armed Forces personnel and their subsequent induction into the Para Military Forces and then on to regular Police forces, have wide implications and require consultations among various ministries and also with the State Governments. These recommendations along with a thorough review of the national security system in its entirety will be considered by an appropriate body to be appointed by the Government.

7 The Committee`s endeavour has been to see what lessons `the country and the guardians of its security` can learn from the Kargil experience. It has not attempted to fix responsibility on particular individuals.

8. While the report clearly concludes that the Kargil conflict resulted in a military and diplomatic victory for the nation, the Government has set into motion steps that will help in plugging the existing loopholes and weaknesses in our security system.